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Two Puzzles About Computation
Samson Abramsky
1 Introduction
Turing’s classical analysis of computation [13] gives a compelling account of the nature of the
computational process; of how we compute. This allows the notion of computability, of what
can in principle be computed, to be captured in a mathematically precise fashion.
The purpose of this note is to raise two different questions, which are rarely if ever con-
sidered, and to which, it seems, we lack convincing, systematic answers. These questions can
be posed as:
• Why do we compute?
• What do we compute?
The point is not so much that we have no answers to these puzzles, as that we have no
established body of theory which gives satisfying, systematic answers, as part of a broader
understanding. By raising these questions, we hope to stimulate some thinking in this direc-
tion.
These puzzles were raised in [2]; see also [3].
2 Why Do We Compute?
The first puzzle is simply stated:
Why do we compute?
By this we mean: why do we perform (or build machines and get them to perform) actual,
physically embodied computations?
There is, indeed, an obvious answer to this question:
To gain information (which, therefore, we did not previously have).
But — how is this possible?1 Two problems seems to arise, one stemming from physics, and
one from logic.
Problem 1: Doesn’t this contradict the second law of thermodynamics?
Problem 2: Isn’t the output implied by the input?
We shall discuss each of these in turn.
1Indeed, I was once challenged on this point by an eminent physicist (now knighted), who demanded to
know how I could speak of information increasing in computation when Shannon Information theory tells us
that it cannot! My failure to answer this point very convincingly at the time led me to continue to ponder the
issue, and eventually gave rise to this discussion.
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Problem 1
The problem is that, presumably, information is conserved in the total system. The natural
response is that, nevertheless, there can be information flow between, and information increase
in, subsystems; just as a body can gain heat from its environment. More precisely, while the
entropy of an isolated (total) system cannot decrease, a sub-system can decrease its entropy
by consuming energy from its environment.
Thus if we wish to speak of information flow and increase, this must be done relative
to subsystems. Indeed, the fundamental objects of study should be open systems, whose
behaviour must be understood in relation to an external environment. Subsystems which can
observe incoming information from their environment, and act to send information to their
environment, have the capabilities of agents.
Moral: Agents and their interactions are intrinsic to the study of information flow and
increase in computation. The classical theories of information do not reflect this adequately.
Observer-dependence of information increase? Yorick Wilks (personal communica-
tion) has suggested the following additional twist. Consider an equation such as
3× 5 = 15.
The forward direction 3× 5 → 15 is obviously a natural direction of computation, where we
perform a multiplication. But the reverse direction 15 → 3 × 5 is also of interest — finding
the prime factors of a number! So it seems that the direction of possible information increase
must be understood as relative to the observer or user of the computation!
Can we in fact find an objective, observer-independent notion of information increase?
This seems important to the whole issue of whether information is inherently subjective, or
whether it has an objective structure.
Problem 2
The second puzzle is the computational version of what has been called the scandal of de-
duction [8, 6, 11]. The logical problem is to find the sense in which logical deduction can be
informative, since, by the nature of the process, the conclusions are ‘logically contained’ in
the premises. So what has been added by the derivation? This is a rather basic question,
which it is surprisingly difficult to find a satisfactory answer to.
Computation can be modelled faithfully as deduction, whether in the sense of deducing the
steps that a Turing maching takes starting from its initial configuration, or more directly via
the Curry-Howard isomorphism [5, 9], under which computation can be viewed as performing
cut-elimination on proofs, or normalization of proof terms. Thus the same question can be
asked of computation: since the result of the computation is logically implied by the program
together with the input data, what has been added by computing it?
The same issue can be formulated in terms of the logic programming paradigm, or of
querying a relational database: in both cases, the result of the query is a logical consequence
of the data- or knowledge-base.
It is, of course, tempting to answer in terms of the complexity of the inference process;
but this seems to beg the question. We need to understand first what the inference process
is doing for us!
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We can also link this puzzle to another well-known issue in logic, namely the principle of
logical omnisicience in epistemic logic, which is unrealistic yet hard to avoid. This principle
can be formulated as follows:
[Kaφ ∧ (φ→ ψ)] → Kaψ.
It says that the knowledge of agent a is deductively closed: if a knows a proposition φ, then he
knows all its logical consequences. This is patently untrue in practice, and brings us directly
back to our puzzle concerning computation. We compute to gain information we did not have.
We start from the information of knowing the program and its input, and the computation
provides us with explicit knowledge of the output. But what does ‘explicit’ mean?
The computational perspective may indeed provide a usefully clarifying perspective on
the issue of logical omniscience, since it provides a context in which the distinction between
‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ knowledge can be made precise. Let us start with the notion of a
function. In the 19th century, the idea of a function as a ‘rule’ — as given by some defining
expression — was replaced by its ‘set-theoretic semantics’ as a set of ordered pairs. In other
terminology, a particular defining expression is an intensional description of a function, while
the set of ordered pairs which it denotes is its extension.
A program is exactly an intensional description of a function, with the additional property
that this description can be used to explicitly calculate outputs from given inputs in a stepwise,
mechanical fashion.2 We can say that implicit knowledge, in the context of computation, is
knowledge of an intensional description; while explicit knowledge, of a data item such as a
number, amounts to possessing the numeral (in some numbering system) corresponding to
that number; or more generally, to possessing a particular form of intensional description
which is essentially isomorphic to the extension.
The purpose of computation in these terms is precisely to convert intensional descriptions
into extensional ones, or implicit knowledge of an input-output pair into explicit knowledge.
The cost of this process is calibrated in terms of the resources needed — the number of
computation steps, the workspace which may be needed to perform these steps, etc. Thus we
return to the usual, ‘common-sense’ view of computation. The point is that it rests on this
distinction between intension and extension, or implicit vs. explicit knowledge.
Another important aspect of why we compute is data reduction—getting rid of a lot of
the information in the input. Note that normal forms are in general unmanagably big [14].
Note also that it is deletion of data which creates thermodynamic cost in computation [10].
Thus we can say that much (or all?) of the actual usefulness of computation lies in getting
rid of the hay-stack, leaving only the needle.
The challenge here is to build a useful theory which provides convincing and helpful
answers to these questions. In our view these puzzles, naive as they are, point to some natural
questions which a truly comprehensive theory of computation, incorporating a ‘dynamics of
information’, should be able to answer.
3 What Do We Compute?
The classical notion of computability as pioneered by Turing [13] focusses on the key issue
of how we compute; of what constitutes a computation. However, it relies on pre-existing
notions from mathematics as to what is computed: numbers, functions, sets, etc.
2We refer e.g. to [7, 12] for attempts to give a precise mathematical characterization of ‘mechanical’.
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This idea also served computer science well for many years: it is perfectly natural in many
situations to view a computational process in terms of computing an output from an input.
This computation may be deterministic, non-deterministic, random, or even quantum, but
essentially the same general paradigm applies.
However, as computation has evolved to embrace diverse forms and purposes: distributed,
global, mobile, interactive, multi-media, embedded, autonomous, virtual, pervasive, . . . the
adequacy of this view has become increasingly doubtful.
Traditionally, the dynamics of computing systems — their unfolding behaviour in space
and time — has been a mere means to the end of computing the function which specifies the
algorithmic problem which the system is solving.3 In much of contemporary computing, the
situation is reversed: the purpose of the computing system is to exhibit certain behaviour.
The implementation of this required behaviour will seek to reduce various aspects of the
specification to the solution of standard algorithmic problems.
What does the Internet compute?
Surely not a mathematical function . . .
Why Does It Matter?
We shall mention two basic issues in the theory of computation which become moot in the
light of this issue.
There has been an enormous amount of work on the first, namely the theory of concurrent
processes. Despite this huge literature, produced over the past four decades and more, no
consensus has been achieved as to what processes are, in terms of their essential mathematical
structure. Instead, there has been a huge proliferation of different models, calculi, semantics,
notions of equivalence. To make the point, we may contrast the situation with the λ-calculus,
the beautiful, fundamental calculus of functions introduced by Church at the very point of
emergence of the notion of computability [4]. Although there are many variants, there is
essentially a unique, core calculus which can be presented in a few lines, and which delineates
the essential ideas of functional computation. In extreme contrast, there are a huge number
of process calculi, and none can be considered as definitive.
Is the notion of process too amorphous, too open to different interpretations and contexts
of use, to admit a unified, fundamental theory? Or has the field not yet found its Turing?
See [1] for an extended discussion.
The second issue follows on from the first, although it has been much less studied to
date. This concerns the Church-Turing thesis of universality of the model of computation.
What does this mean when we move to a broader conception of what is computed? And are
there any compelling candidates? Is there a widely accepted universal model of interactive
or concurrent computation?
As a corollary to the current state of our understanding of processes as described in the
previous paragraphs, there is no such clear-cut notion of universality. It is important to
understand what is at issue here. If we are interested in the process of computation itself,
3Insofar as the dynamics has been of interest, it has been in quantitative terms, counting the resources
which the algorithmic process consumes — leading of course to the notions of algorithmic complexity. Is it
too fanciful to speculate that the lack of an adequate structural theory of processes has been an impediment
to fundamental progress in complexity theory?
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the structure of interactive behaviour, then on what basis can we judge if one such process
is faithfully simulated by another? It is not of course that there are no candidate notions of
this kind which have been proposed in the literature; the problem, rather, is that there are
far too many of them, reflecting different intuitions, and different operational and application
scenarios.
Once again, we must ask: is this embarrassing multitude of diverse and competing notions
a necessary reflection of the nature of this notion, or may we hope for an incisive contribution
from some future Turing which will unify and organize the field?
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